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Gender differences in applying for STEM programs in 
higher education: evidence from a policy shift in 
Hungary 
Koen Declercq, Joris Ghysels, Júlia Varga 
Abstract  
We study how admission policies in higher education affect enrollment decisions of men 
and women and the decision to apply to STEM programs. More specifically, we investigate 
how an increase in the relative acceptance probability for STEM programs affects these 
decisions. We apply our analysis to Hungary and we evaluate a policy reform that limited 
access to subsidized non-STEM programs. We find that this change in the selectivity of the 
admission system differently affected application decisions of men and women. After the 
reform, fewer students applied to higher education and the reform especially discouraged 
the participation of women. After the reform, more men and women applied to STEM 
programs or non-subsidized non-STEM programs in which they have to pay tuition fees. 
This last effect is stronger for women. As the reform affected the chance to be admitted to 
higher education, we estimate a structural model to analyze how the responsiveness to 
admission probabilities in application decisions differs between men and women. We find 
that women are more sensitive to admission probabilities. Finally, we use the model to 
simulate the impact of alternative admission policies on enrollment in STEM programs. 
We find that an open access policy in STEM programs would stimulate more men and 
women to apply to these programs. 
Keywords: higher education, admission, gender differences, STEM, structural model 
JEL: I21, I23, I24, J16, J24 
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A nemek közötti különbségek a felsőoktatási STEM 
programokba irányuló jelentkezésekben: 
egy magyarországi szakpolitikai változás hatásának 
elemzése 
 
Koen Declercq, Joris Ghysels, Varga Júlia 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány azt vizsgálta, hogy a felsőoktatási felvételi politika hogyan hat a férfiak és nők 
továbbtanulási döntésére, valamit arra, hogy az u.n. STEM képzési területekre 
(Természettudomány, Technológia, Mérnöki tudomány, Matematika) jelentkezzenek. Azt 
elemeztük, hogy a STEM programokra való bekerülési esélyek relatív növekedése milyen 
hatással van e döntésekre. Annak  a magyarországi felsőoktatási reformnek a hatását 
vizsgáltuk, mely korlátozta az állami finanszírozású nem STEM képzésekre felvettek 
számát. Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy a felvételi lehetőségek szelektivitása 
különbözőképpen hatott a férfial és nők továbbtanulási döntésére. A reform után kevesebb 
tanuló jelentkezett a felsőoktatásba, és a reform a nőket különösen eltántorította a 
felsőoktatási jelentkezéstől. A reformot követően mindkét nemből többen jelentkeztek 
STEM programokra és költségtérítéses nem STEM programokra is. A költségtérítéses 
képzésre jelentkezés különösen a nők körében nőtt meg. Mivel a reform a felsőoktatásba 
történő bekerülés esélyét váltiztatta meg,  egy strukturális modell segítségével azt 
elemeztük hogy a felvételi esélyek változásához való alkalmazkodás különbözik-e nemek 
szerint. Az eredmények szerint a nők érzékenyebben reagáltak a felvételi esélyek 
változására. Végül, a modell segítségével  egy alternatív felsőoktatási felvételi politika, a 
bekerülési korlátok eltörlésének hatását szimuláltuk. Azt találtuk, hogy a felvételi korlátok 
eltörlése több nőt és férfit vonzana a STEM programokba. 
 
Kulcsszavak: felsőoktatás, felvételi, gender különbségek, STEM, strukturális modell 
JEL:  I21, I23, I24, J16, J24 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well documented that the share of women enrolled in higher education has been 
increasing during the last decades. Now, more women than men attend and complete 
higher education (Vincent and Lancrin, 2008; OECD, 2015). Nevertheless, in most 
countries, the difference between men and women in the choice of college majors is large 
and persistent. Women are less likely to study Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics (STEM subjects) than men. In 2015, the average share of women among new 
entrants in higher education in OECD countries was only 19% in ICT majors, and 25% in 
engineering courses, while 54% of new entrants in higher education were female (OECD, 
2017). We observe a similar pattern in Hungary, the focus of our analysis. In 2011, 57% of 
applicants to higher education were female, but the share of women applying to STEM 
programs was only 23%. The underrepresentation of women in STEM fields may have 
negative implications for the supply of qualified labor in science and engineering. As 
STEM degrees seem to be very profitable private investments for college graduates 
(Arcidiacono, 2004), differences in the choice of the field of study seem to explain a 
significant part of the gender wage differential amongst graduates.1 The persistence of 
horizontal gender segregation may hinder the closing of the gender gap in earnings.  
Previous literature has already investigated why women are less likely to enroll in 
STEM programs. Several explanations have been suggested. A first strand of the literature 
shows that students consider expected earnings when making educational choices (See for 
example Montmarquette et al., 2002, Varga, 2006, Boudarbat, 2008, and Arcidiacono et 
al. 2012). However, women expect smaller earnings gains from higher education studies 
than men even when controlling for the field of study. Additionally, women are less 
responsive to expected earnings than men and therefore they are less likely to enroll in 
study programs that lead to higher labor market returns such as STEM programs. Other 
studies investigated the role of gender differences in abilities. Paglin and Rufolo (1990) 
found that the difference in mathematical ability is the main reason for the difference in 
the major choice by gender. The findings of other research show that ability sorting is less 
able to explain the underrepresentation of women in STEM majors as the gender gap in 
                                                 
1 See for example Daymont and Andrisiani (1984), Machin and Puhani (2003), and Black et al. 
(2008). 
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mathematics achievement and aptitude is small and has decreased for several decades 
(Friedman, 1989; Xie and Shauman 2003; Goldin et al. 2006).2  
Another strand of the literature investigated the role of differences in risk aversion by 
gender (Bertrand, 2010; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Gneezy et 
al., 2003) and gender differences in overconfidence and competitiveness (Reuben et al. 
2015). These studies found that women are more risk-averse and are less self-confident 
about their academic abilities than men. This also explains gender differences in the 
choice of field of study and why women are less likely to apply to more competitive study 
programs than men.  
Other research concludes that the above channels are less important in explaining 
gender differences in enrollment in STEM programs and investigates the role of 
preferences. Zafar (2013) finds that gender differences in college majors can mainly be 
explained by differences in preferences and tastes between male and female students and 
differences in beliefs about future earnings explain only a small part of the gap. Gemici 
and Wiswall (2014) show that gender differences in the distribution of major-specific 
skills, while significant, are far less important in explaining the gender gap and that 
differences in preferences for majors are the main driving force behind the gender gap in 
college major choice.  
Taken together, research suggests that preferences may be an important reason for the 
under-representation of women in STEM fields. However, preferences are usually 
considered to be constant over time in previous research. This paper contributes to the 
literature by investigating whether changes in admission standards affect the choice of 
STEM programs and could thereby affect the gender composition in STEM programs. We 
use an exogenous shock to the likelihood of selection for a college major which was 
relatively favourable for STEM-programs in Hungary and investigate how women and 
men adapted their choices for STEM majors in response to this shock. Limiting the 
number of state-funded places in non-STEM programs makes applying to these programs 
more competitive. If women are more risk-averse, they would be more affected by such a 
                                                 
2 Wang et al. (2013) found that the pattern of gender differences in math and verbal ability may 
result in females having a wider choice of careers, in both STEM and non-STEM fields, compared 
with males. They found that mathematically capable individuals who also had high verbal skills 
were less likely to pursue STEM careers than were individuals who had high math skills but 
moderate verbal skills and that the group with high math and high verbal ability included more 
females than males. 
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policy reform and decide not to apply to higher education anymore or apply to other fields 
of study if they perceive programs in other fields of study as adequate substitutes. 
We apply our analysis to Hungary where students are selected before enrollment by 
high school results and matriculation exam scores. Students submit their ranking of 
preferred study options and can choose between state-funded places in which they do not 
have to pay tuition fees or self-funded places in which they pay for the full costs of their 
education. As fewer students apply for self-funded places, the odds of being admitted to 
these programs are larger. Ranking at least one self-funded option can be a good strategy 
in order to increase the probability of admission. 
We consider multiple outcomes and evaluate the impact of the reform on (1) the 
decision to apply to higher education, (2) the number of study options ranked on the 
preference list, (3) the choice between STEM and non-STEM programs, and (4) the 
probability of choosing for a self-funded place.3 To uncover the behavioral mechanisms 
that lead to the realized outcomes, we estimate a structural model of program and 
institution choice. As the reform affected the chance to be admitted to higher education, 
we assess how responsive men and women are to the odds of being admitted to a program 
when making their application decisions. We estimate the model on a cohort before the 
policy change and externally validate the model on the cohort that was affected by the 
reform. We show that our model performs reasonably well in predicting major choices 
out-of-sample. Finally, we use the model to simulate how an alternative policy that 
stimulates enrollment in STEM programs without discouraging students to apply for other 
programs, would affect application decisions of men and women. 
Our main finding is that admission policies differently affect application decisions of 
men and women. After the reform, fewer students applied to higher education. This effect 
is larger for women. After the reform, more men and women apply for STEM and self-
funded programs. This last effect is stronger for women and after the reform, 
proportionally more women switched to a self-funded non-STEM program. The structural 
model provides further explanations for these findings and shows that women have lower 
preferences for STEM programs, but they are more responsive to admission probabilities 
when making their choices. We show that an open access policy in STEM programs would 
stimulate more men and women to apply to these programs. Under this alternative policy, 
                                                 
3 The reform reduced the number of state-funded options in which students do not have to pay 
tuition fees in non-STEM programs. After the reform, almost no students were admitted to state-
funded programs in economics, while the number of students admitted to state-funded STEM 
programs was almost not affected. 
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more men than women will substitute to STEM programs. This policy will, therefore, 
further increase the gender gap in STEM programs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional 
overview of higher education in Hungary and the admission system and discusses the 
policy reform. Section 3 takes a first look at the rich register-based data, describing 
application decisions before and after the reform. Section 4 evaluates the causal impact of 
the reform. Section 5 sets up and estimates the structural model and assesses how well the 
model predicts choices within and out-of-sample. Finally, section 6 simulates the impact 
of an alternative admission policy that stimulates enrollment in STEM programs. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.1  ADMISSION TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN HUNGARY 
 
All high school graduates who successfully passed the matriculation exams, that is whose 
results exceeded the 25 % threshold, are entitled to apply to academic higher education.4 
The Hungarian secondary school system is stratified with three types of secondary schools. 
The academic secondary schools and the vocational secondary schools provide 
matriculation exams while the vocational training schools do not, that is students finishing 
vocational training schools are not entitled to apply for higher education studies. Students 
finishing their studies in academic secondary schools or vocational secondary schools have 
to take matriculation exams of Hungarian literature and grammar, mathematics, history, 
one foreign language and at least one subject of the student's choice (this can be anything 
that they have learned before for at least 2 years).5 The choice of the additional 
                                                 
4 We study application decisions to academic higher education. There are two types of academic 
programs: academic bachelor programs and undivided programs. Academic bachelor programs last 
for three or four years. After completing an academic bachelor program, students can apply or a 
master program. Undivided programs are for example medicine or law. These programs provide 
first degrees, but their duration is longer than that of the bachelor programs. The undivided 
programs last at least for five years (in the case of medicine 6 years). Students can also apply to 
study options in vocational higher education. As these options differ from academic higher 
education and typically take only one or two years of studying, we do not consider these options in 
our analysis.  
5 For each high school graduate, we observe the result on all matriculation exams that this student 
has taken. All high school graduates of academic and vocational secondary schools take 
matriculation exams in mathematics, Hungarian language and history. As we observe for all 
potential applicants only exam scores on these three courses, our analysis considers only these 
three courses.   
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matriculation exams depends on the programs students apply for (e.g. if a student applies 
for engineering, she has to take a matriculation exam for physics).  
In February, prospective students can apply for a given orientation (such as 
economics, education, medical studies) at a specific institution for the next academic 
year.6 Students may apply to as many study options as they want, but they must state their 
preference ranking. Students pay a fixed fee of approximately 30 euro when they apply to 
higher education and they are charged an additional fee for every program of about 10 
euro after the third program they rank. Most applicants, therefore, limit their ranking to at 
most 4 programs. Higher education institutions, irrespective of being state-owned or 
private, offer state-funded and fee-paying places for applicants. The amount of the tuition 
fee is determined by higher education institutions in accordance with regulations 
stipulated by government decrees and differs between programs. The tuition fee 
corresponds approximately to the minimum monthly wage (around 300 EUR) charged for 
each semester (Biro, 2011), but differs between programs. Tuition fees are on average 
higher for STEM than for non-STEM programs although medical training is the most 
expensive as in most other countries. The applicants must also indicate whether they are 
willing to pay the contribution or whether they are applying for a state-financed place 
regarding each program in their lists. (For example, the first choice of a student may be a 
state-financed place in economics at institution A, her second choice might be a state-
financed place in law in institution B, and her third choice can be a privately-financed 
place in economics again at institution A and so on.) When making the decision to apply to 
a privately-financed place, students trade off the higher costs of applying to such a study 
option with the higher odds of being accepted to at least one program.  
The matching scheme is based on a centralized scoring system. The scores are coming 
from students’ secondary school grades and the results of the matriculation exams.7 
Students take these matriculation exams in May and June after they have submitted their 
applications. Students can choose between normal or advanced matriculation exams. An 
advanced matriculation exam may result in extra scores, but these are more difficult to 
pass. Exams are centralized, but a student may have different scores for different 
                                                 
6 We consider only applications to full-time academic higher education. There are also some part-
time programs, but almost all high school graduates apply for full-time academic programs. 
7 Before 2000, the system was less centralized and universities could hold interviews (Biro, 2011).  
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programs, as only the relevant subjects are considered.8 Extra scores can be obtained if the 
applicant has a certificate in foreign languages, or if the applicant is from a disadvantaged 
family background. The specific algorithm used in the matching process is a variant of the 
deferred acceptance algorithm (Shorrer and Sovago, 2018). Students obtain a score for 
each program they applied to.  
Each year, the Ministry of Human Resources determines the number of students 
admitted to tuition-free, state-financed places by field of study and institutions. The 
number of students admitted to fee paying places is also determined by the government. 
Based on the scores of all students and the capacity of the program, the government 
announces a minimum score in July that students have to achieve in order to be admitted 
to the program. Each student gets at most one offer if he or she achieved the minimum 
admission score to one or more study programs at specific institutions. If a student 
achieved the minimum admission score for an institution/field specialization he or she has 
applied for with a better preference ranking, he or she will be refused automatically from 
other institutions/fields of specialization even if he or she has achieved the minimum 
admission score of the latter institutions, as well. Students accepted to a degree program 
in a certain field of study follow an established program of courses and exams.  Mobility is 
low between programs, and it is difficult to change fields of study once accepted to a 
specific degree program. Students who are not admitted in a main round that ends in July 
can participate in the second matching round for unfilled programs at the end of the 
summer.9 
2.2 THE POLICY REFORM 
 
In December 2011, the Hungarian government announced that it would substantially 
decrease the number of state-financed places in higher education in 2012. Figure 1 shows 
that the total number of students admitted to full-time state-funded academic higher 
education for first degrees decreased from 39000 in 2011 to 31000 in 2012. The reason for 
this reform was that according to the government, too many students were attending 
higher education which leads to overinvestments in general and in some fields of studies. 
The aim of the reform was to decrease the number of students in higher education, 
                                                 
8 For example: for computer science programs, the grades and exam scores for physics are counted, 
but for economics, the exam score of economics is considered instead, besides the main subjects 
such as mathematics, Hungarian literature and grammar and history. 
9 In our analysis, we consider only applications for the first main round that ends in July. 
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especially in non-STEM programs. A further aim was to cut public expenses and increase 
cost-sharing in higher education in order to reduce the public debt. In more recent years, 
the Hungarian government again increased the number of places, but to a lower level as 
before the reform. 
Figure 1 
Number of admitted students to academic programs 
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Note: Total number of admitted students in academic programs full-time education.  
Based on own calculations. 
 
Table 1 shows the changes in the number of admitted students to STEM and non-
STEM programs and by more detailed fields of study. There was a large decrease in the 
number of admitted students to state-funded places to non-STEM programs between 2012 
and 2011. The number of admitted students in 2012 was only 69% of the number of 
admitted students in 2011 (or a decrease from 20599 to 14170). The decrease was much 
smaller for STEM programs. More than 94 percent of the number of admitted students to 
state-funded places in STEM programs was admitted in 2012. The number of admitted 
students to self-funded places moved in the opposite direction. For non-STEM programs, 
there was a 30% increase while for STEM programs there was a decrease of about 20%. 
The fact that fewer students were admitted to state-funded non-STEM programs and that 
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the number of students admitted to state-funded STEM programs did almost not change, 
increased the relative probability of acceptance for state-financed STEM programs. This 
could have stimulated more students to apply for state-funded STEM programs. 
Table 1 
 Number of admitted students to academic higher education 
 2011 2012 2012/2011 % 
 
State- 
funded 
Self-
funded Total 
State- 
funded 
Self-
funded Total 
State- 
funded 
Self-
funded Total 
STEM-fields          
     ENG 13994 763 14757 13635 464 14099 97.4 60.8 95.5 
     SCI 4066 90 4156 3389 211 3600 83.3 234.4 86.6 
     Total 18060 853 18913 17024 675 17699 94.3 79.1 93.6 
          
Non-STEM fields         
     SSCI 5715 3556 9271 3530 4452 7982 61.8 125.2 86.1 
     ECON 4486 4630 9116 246 7337 7583 5.5 158.5 83.2 
     TEACH 1797 399 2196 1530 505 2035 85.1 126.6 92.7 
     HEALTH 3833 245 4078 4051 156 4207 105.7 63.7 103.2 
     AGRI 1818 648 2466 2049 503 2552 112.7 77.6 103.5 
     LAW 1454 1798 3252 1028 1881 2909 70.7 104.6 89.5 
     ARTS 1496 780 2276 1736 853 2589 116.0 109.4 113.8 
     Total 20599 12056 32655 14170 15687 29857 68.8 130.1 91.4 
          
Total 38659 12908 51568 31194 16362 47556 80.7 126.8 92.2 
Note: Total number of admitted students in academic programs full-time education in 2011 and 
2012. Based on own calculations. The numbers in the last three columns present the number of 
students admitted in 2012 relative to the number of students admitted in 2011 and are expressed in 
percentages. 
 
Nevertheless, there were differences by more detailed field specializations within the 
STEM and non-STEM groups. Between 2011 and 2012 the number of admitted students to 
state-funded places in Engineering and Computer Sciences (ENG) decreased by less than 3 
percent while the number of students admitted to state-funded places in Natural Sciences 
(SCI) decreased about 17 percent. As for non-STEM programs:  there were large cuts in the 
number of students admitted to state-funded places in Economics (ECON), Law and 
Administration (LAW), Humanities and Social Sciences (SSCI), and teacher training 
(TEACH). These are the fields where women were traditionally overrepresented. The cuts 
were largest in the field of economics. In 2011, 4486 students were admitted to a state-
funded place in economics. After the reform, this number decreased to 246. There we 
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observe large shifts from state-financed to privately-financed programs. Before the 
reform, 4630 students were admitted to a self-funded program in economics. This number 
increased to 7337 after the reform. This shows that many students are willing to pay the 
tuition fee in order to attend higher education. There were also small increases in the 
number of students admitted to some non-STEM programs such as Health, Agricultural 
Sciences (AGRI), and culture and languages (ARTS). 
 
3. APPLICATIONS TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN HUNGARY 
3.1 DATA 
To analyze how the reform affected application decisions, we make use of a rich 
administrative dataset. We observe the full sample of high school graduates from 
academic and vocational high schools in the matriculation examination data of the 
Hungarian Education Office. Our sample contains all students who took the matriculation 
exams in 2011 and 2012. For each student, we have detailed information on the exam 
results for mathematics, Hungarian language, and history. We also observe gender, date of 
birth, and secondary school. Based on a unique student identification number, we merge 
this dataset with the full sample of application-admission data of the Higher Education 
Admission Office.10 The application-admission dataset contains data for all applications of 
the students: the institution/faculty where the students made an application, name of the 
program, level of the program, a form of funding, and the program where the applicant 
was admitted.11 We omit applications to vocational higher education from the preference 
ranking of students because we limit the analysis to application decisions to academic 
higher education. In principle, students can rank as many study options as they want but 
we observe that only 0.7% of applicants ranks more than 6 options. The variable cost that 
students have to pay for each study program they rank after the third ranked program, can 
be a possible explanation for the fact that students do not rank more options. Because only 
                                                 
10 Based on a personal ID number, we could match the students in the two datasets (about 200-300 
cases or 0.03 percent of applicants could not be merged.)  
11 For the students who apply to higher education, we have additional information about the type of 
secondary school, high school results, an indicator for being from disadvantaged family background 
and whether the students obtained a foreign language exam certificate. However, we do not observe 
this information for students who do not apply to higher education. We therefore only use this 
information in the regressions that contain only the sample of applicants. 
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0.7% of applicants rank more than 6 options, we consider only the first 6 options to 
academic programs on the preference ranking in our analysis. 
 
3.2 HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 
Table 2 compares the sample of students who graduated from academic and vocational 
secondary schools before and after the policy reform. In 2012, fewer students graduated 
due to a demographic decline in Hungary (T-tudok, 2015). Proportionally more women 
than men graduate from high school. On average, students graduate from high school at 
the age of 19. This average age is slightly higher for men (19.2) compared with women 
(19.1). Graduation age at the high school has not changed after the reform.  
To graduate from high school, all students have to take matriculation exams in the 
following three courses: Hungarian language, mathematics and history. In Table 2, we 
observe that women perform better on the Hungarian language, but worse on 
mathematics. Exam scores are similar before and after the reform but are slightly lower 
for history.12 Students can choose for a normal matriculation exam or an advanced exam. 
Performing well on these advanced exams increases the probability of being admitted to 
higher education. However, only a small fraction of students choose an advanced exam. 
Women are more likely to choose for an advanced exam in the Hungarian language, but 
less likely to choose for an advanced exam in mathematics. After the reform, a slightly 
larger fraction of high school graduates choose for an advanced exam. The increased 
selectivity to higher education after the reform could have influenced the decision to 
choose for a matriculation exam of the normal level or the advanced level. Figure A1 in 
Appendix illustrates the distribution of the matriculation exam scores for the three 
courses. The distribution of exam scores looks similar before and after the policy reform 
and confirms the finding of Table 2 that scores of high school graduates on mathematics 
are slightly higher after the reform, and that the scores on Hungarian language and history 
are slightly lower after the reform. 
 
                                                 
12 Note that the average matriculation exam score is slightly higher than 50% for mathematics and 
Hungarian language, implying that a substantial fraction of the students scores below 50%. These 
students can still apply to academic higher education as the threshold is at 25%. Nevertheless, the 
fact that they performed less well decreases their chances of being admitted to higher education. 
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Table 2  
High school graduates  
 Men Women 
 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Age 19.2 19.2 19.1 19.1 
Exam scores     
     Math 50.4 50.7 47.0 49.5 
     Hungarian 
language 
54.9 53.4 63.5 61.1 
     History 63.5 59.8 64.2 59.6 
The fraction of students choosing for an advanced exam  
     Hungarian 
language 
0.3 0.4 1.9 2.3 
     Math 3.5 4.6 1.8 2.3 
     History 5.8 6.7 6.6 7.8 
Budapest 23.7 23.0 21.5 21.2 
Total 37522 36221 43055 41715 
Note: Background characteristics of all students who graduate from academic and vocational 
secondary education. Exam scores are expressed as percentages. The fraction of students choosing 
for an advanced exam is expressed as a percentage of high school graduates. 
 
Performing well on the different matriculation exams increases the probability of 
being admitted to higher education, but the weight attached to each exam differs between 
programs. Students who apply only to STEM programs might, therefore, study more for 
mathematics than students who apply only to language programs. The scores might, 
therefore, reflect both ability and study effort. Note that there is a positive weight for 
mathematics, Hungarian language and history for all programs in higher education. 
Students, therefore, have an incentive to score well on all three courses. Students who do 
not apply to higher education also have an incentive to perform well on the matriculation 
exams because matriculation exams are required by the employers in many positions. 
Finally, we also observe the location of the secondary school of students which is a proxy 
for the place of residence. Approximately 22% of students attended a high school in 
Budapest, the capital and economic center of Hungary.   
 
3.3 APPLICANTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
Table 3 compares the decision to apply to academic higher education before and after the 
policy reform. After the reform, less high school graduates applied to higher education. 
Women are more likely to apply to higher education than men but were more discouraged 
from applying by the reform. The fraction of women applying to higher education dropped 
from 61.8% to 54.8% (-7.0 %points), compared with a 4.6 %points decrease for men (a 
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change from 54.4% to 49.8%). Students who are older than 19 when graduating from high 
school are less likely to apply to higher education. Both young and older students are less 
likely to apply after the reform. 
Table 3 
 Applying to higher education 
 Men Women 
 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Total 54.4 49.8 61.8 54.8 
Student background     
Age     
     ≤19 years 56.3 51.8 64.2 57.0 
     +19 years 49.6 44.8 55.3 48.9 
Exam scores     
     Hungarian <50% 28.9 24.3 27.1 22.0 
     Hungarian ≥50%   72.9 70.4 74.6 69.3 
     Math <50% 32.7 26.2 44.3 34.0 
     Math ≥50%   79.9 77.9 87.1 80.4 
     History <50% 24.0 21.7 27.3 25.4 
     History ≥50%   64.4 63.2 73.1 69.4 
Advanced exam     
     Hungarian 
language 
93.2 93.7 95.0 91.9 
     Math 97.2 97.0 97.4 96.2 
     History 94.8 92.4 96.2 94.6 
Residence     
     Budapest 60.7 56.9 65.3 59.0 
     Other region 52.4 47.7 60.9 53.7 
Note: Descriptive statistics are expressed as a percentage of the total number of male and female 
high school graduates before and after the reform.  
 
The scores on the matriculation exams are an important factor of the decision to apply 
to higher education. Students who perform well, with scores above 50%, are more likely to 
apply for higher education. Students with low exam scores are more affected by the reform 
and less likely to apply to higher education. We observe a similar effect for the three 
courses. However, this effect differs between men and women. Men who perform well on 
their matriculation exams are almost not affected by the policy reform. Application 
decisions of men with high scores on mathematics or Hungarian language dropped by 
about 2 %points. However, women with high scores exhibit a larger decrease in the 
probability to apply to higher education of about 7 %points. We observe a similar pattern 
for the other two courses. Next, Table 3 shows that almost all students who choose for an 
advanced matriculation exam apply to higher education. However, these students are also 
affected by the reform as the fraction of students applying to higher education also 
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decreases for these students. While there is almost no decrease in the probability to apply 
to higher education for men (except for the students who choose the advanced exam for 
history), women who choose the advanced exams were less likely to apply after the reform. 
Finally, we observe that students living in the area of Budapest are more likely to apply to 
higher education. Both students who live in Budapest and in the rest of Hungary are less 
likely to apply to higher education after the reform. 
 
3.4 THE PREFERENCE RANKING OF STUDENTS 
Table 4 studies the complete preference ranking and presents the first and the last option 
students apply to, and the total number of options students rank on their preference list.13 
We consider all high school graduates before and after the reform. We distinguish between 
STEM and non-STEM programs and state-funded and self-funded places. The numbers 
are expressed as a percentage of high school graduates. Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 
provide more detailed information about the specific major students apply to. The first 
two panels of Table 4 consider the option that students ranked first on their application 
file. We immediately observe large differences between men and women. Before the 
reform, 25.2% of male high school graduates ranked a STEM program first, while this is 
only 7.1% for women. After the reform, a similar fraction of male high school graduates 
ranked a STEM program first, but a larger fraction of female high school graduates (8.2%) 
now prefers a STEM program.  
Most students prefer a state-funded place, both before and after the reform. However, 
after the reform, a larger fraction of the students applied for a self-funded place. This 
effect is largest for programs in economics as shown in Table A1 in Appendix. This field of 
study was most affected by the reform. Proportionally more women apply for a self-funded 
place after the reform. This can be explained by the fact that the reform made applying for 
state funded non-STEM programs less attractive. In these programs, women are 
overrepresented. Note that ranking a self-funded program first is not a rational strategy 
for students if there are also state-funded places in the same program, which was less 
likely in non-STEM programs after the reform. Students can rank as many programs as 
they want, and they do not have to pay an additional contribution if they rank a self-
funded program if they already ranked the same state-funded program. Shorrer and 
                                                 
13 For students who apply to only 1 program in higher education, the last option on their preference 
list is the same option as the first ranked program. 
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Sovago (2018) study these mistakes in rankings in Hungary and find that the fraction of 
students making such mistakes has increased after the reform. 
Table 4 
 Application decisions in higher education: ranking 
 Men Women 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: First ranked option (2011) 
STEM 25.1 0.1 25.2 7.1 0.0 7.1 
Non-STEM 27.6 1.6 29.2 52.8 1.9 54.7 
Total 52.7 1.7 54.4 60.0 1.9 61.8 
       
Panel B: First ranked option (2012) 
STEM 24.8 0.4 25.2 8.1 0.1 8.2 
Non-STEM 18.3 6.3 24.6 36.5 10.1 46.6 
Total 43.1 6.7 49.8 44.6 10.2 54.8 
       
Panel C: Last ranked option (2011) 
STEM 23.9 2.8 26.8 8.6 0.7 9.2 
Non-STEM 19.3 8.4 27.7 40.3 12.3 52.6 
Total 43.2 11.2 54.4 48.9 13.0 61.8 
       
Panel D: Last ranked option (2012) 
STEM 19.1 7.2 26.2 7.7 2.0 9.7 
Non-STEM 11.0 12.5 23.6 24.2 20.9 45.1 
Total 30.1 19.7 49.8 31.9 22.9 54.8 
       
Panel E: Total number of options (2011)   
STEM 1.5 0.1 1.6 0.4 0.0 0.4 
Non-STEM 1.6 0.4 2.0 2.8 0.5 3.3 
Total 3.1 0.5 3.6 3.2 0.5 3.6 
       
Panel F: Total number of options (2012)    
STEM 1.6 0.4 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.6 
Non-STEM 1.1 0.8 1.9 2.1 1.2 3.3 
Total 2.7 1.2 3.9 2.6 1.3 3.9 
Note: The fraction of students applying to each option in panel A-D is expressed as a percentage of 
high school graduates of respectively 2011 and 2012. The total number of options students rank on 
their preference list in panel E and F is the average of all high school graduates who apply to higher 
education in 2001 and 2012. 
 
The following two panels of Table 4 look at the last option ranked on the application 
list of students. We observe similar patterns as for the first ranked option when we look at 
the major decision. However, we observe that more students rank a self-funded place as 
their last option, especially after the reform. 11.2% of men and 13.0% of women ranked a 
self-funded program on the last place before the reform. This fraction increases to 
respectively 19.7% and 22.9% for men and women after the reform. In these self-funded 
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places, students have a higher probability of being admitted. Varga (2006) shows that 
students are more sensitive to their expected admission probabilities for their last ranked 
option than for their most preferred option. Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix show that after 
the reform, more students applied to a self-funded program in economics than a similar 
state-funded option. This can be explained by the fact that after the reform the 
government reduced the number of state funded places to almost 0 in economics. 
The final 2 panels of Table 4 illustrate how the reform affected the total number of 
study options, the number of self-funded options, and the number of STEM programs for 
which students apply. We consider only students who applied for at least one study option. 
Before the reform, students applied on average for 3.6 programs. After the reform, 
applicants ranked on average 3.9 options. This pattern is similar for men and women. 
Students could have decided to apply to more options in order to increase their probability 
of being admitted in the more selective post reform period. Alternatively, the reform could 
have discouraged applications from students who would otherwise have ranked few 
options and have now decided not to apply to higher education. We also observe that the 
reform affected the decision to apply to STEM and self-funded options which were less 
affected by the policy reform. Before the reform, applicants ranked on average 0.5 self-
funded places. This number increased to 1.2 for men and 1.3 for women after the reform. 
Men rank more STEM programs than women before and after the reform. The increase in 
STEM options after the reform is larger for men. 
 
4. EVALUATION OF THE REFORM 
 
The descriptive statistics in the previous section already provide some first evidence about 
the potential effects of the reform on application decisions in higher education. In this 
section, we evaluate how the reform differently affected the decision to apply to higher 
education, the choice between STEM and non-STEM programs, and the choice between 
state-funded and self-funded programs of men and women after controlling for student 
background. To investigate the impact of the reform, we estimate the following regression 
equation: 
 
The coefficient of interest  identifies how women responded differently to the reform 
than men. In all specifications, we control for matriculation exam scores. We also control 
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for the level of the matriculation exams by including a dummy equal to one if a student 
took an advanced exam. We additionally control for age, socio-economic background of 
the students, and region fixed effects.14 We estimate the probability of applying to higher 
education and the probability of choosing for STEM or self-funded places by logit, and we 
report marginal effects. We estimate the number of options students rank by OLS. Table 5 
shows only the coefficients for gender, the period after the reform, and the interaction 
between both variables. Tables A3-A5 in Appendix show the full regression output. 
Table 5 
 Evaluation of the reform  
 Apply Total options 
 Coef. St. error Coef. St. error 
Female 0.080* (0.004) 0.096* (0.014) 
2012 -0.047* (0.004) 0.272* (0.015) 
Female*2012 -0.049* (0.006) -0.111* (0.020) 
 STEM ranked first STEM ranked last At least one STEM Total STEM 
 Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error 
Female -0.299* (0.005) -0.305* (0.005) -0.339* (0.005) -0.912* (0.013) 
2012 0.018* (0.004) 0.016* (0.004) 0.014* (0.005) 0.302* (0.017) 
Female*2012 -0.005 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) 0.004 (0.007) -0.239* (0.020) 
 Self ranked first Self ranked last At least one Self Total Self 
 Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error 
Female 0.003 (0.003) 0.012* (0.005) 0.022* (0.005) 0.049 (0.010) 
2012 0.105* (0.003) 0.200* (0.005) 0.245* (0.005) 0.660* (0.013) 
Female*2012 0.026* (0.004) 0.017* (0.006) 0.028* (0.007) 0.114* (0.017) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The decision to apply for higher education 
and to rank a STEM or self-funded program is estimated by a logit regression. Results are reported 
as marginal effects. The regressions for the total number of options that students rank are 
estimated by OLS. The decision to apply to higher education is estimated on the sample of all high 
school graduates of 2011 and 2012 (158513 observations), while the other regressions are limited to 
the sample of high school graduates who rank at least one option (87939 observations). All 
regressions control for age, matriculation exam scores, and region fixed effects. The regressions 
that are estimated on the sample of applicants additionally control for socio-economic background. 
The complete output of the regressions is presented in Tables A3-A5 in Appendix. 
 
The first panel of Table 5 shows how the reform affected the decision to apply to higher 
education and the number of study programs students rank on their preference list. Before 
the reform, women were 8.0 %points more likely to apply to higher education than men. 
This finding confirms the higher application rates of women shown in Table 3. Next, we 
observe that the reform discouraged the decision to apply to higher education. After the 
reform, students are significantly less likely to apply to higher education. The interaction 
                                                 
14 We observe socio-economic status only for the sample of applicants and not for the students who 
did not apply to higher education. Socio-economic status is measured by a dummy variable equal to 
one if the per capita household income is lower than 130% of the minimum pension.  
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effect between gender and the dummy for the period after the reform reveals that the 
reform mostly affected the application decisions of female students. The probability to 
apply to higher education decreased by 4.7 %points for men, but by 9.6 %points for 
women. This can be explained by the fact that the reform discouraged enrollment in non-
STEM programs that are typically preferred by women as shown in Table 4. The second 
regression of Table 5 shows how the reform affected the total number of study options 
students rank on the preference ranking. Before the reform, women applied to 0.10 more 
study options than men. After the reform, both men and women applied to more options. 
However, the increase is larger for men (+0.27) than for women (+0.16), and male 
applicants now apply to more options than women. 
The second panel of Table 5 assesses whether the reform affected the decision to apply 
to STEM programs. After the reform, there were less state-funded places in non-STEM 
programs. Students could therefore apply more to STEM programs in order to increase 
their chances to be admitted to higher education. We consider only the students who 
applied to at least one study program. The first two specifications estimate the probability 
of ranking a STEM program on the first and last place on the preference ranking. Before 
the reform, women are 29.9 %points less likely than men to rank a STEM program as their 
most preferred option. After the reform, both men and women are more likely to rank a 
STEM program (+1.8 %points). We do not find a significantly different effect of the reform 
between men and women. We obtain similar results when we consider the last option on 
the preference ranking in the second regression. The third column shows that before the 
reform women were 33.9 %points less likely than men to rank at least one STEM program. 
The reform increased the fraction of male and female applicants applying to at least one 
STEM program by 1.4 %points. The last column shows that female applicants ranked on 
average 0.91 STEM options less than men before the reform. After the reform, male 
applicants ranked on average 0.33 STEM options more than before the reform. The 
number of STEM options ranked by female applicants increased by a smaller amount of 
0.06.  
The last panel of Table 7 investigates whether students were more likely to apply for 
self-funded places after the reform. When accepted to a self-funded place, students must 
pay a tuition fee. Before the reform, men and women were equally likely to rank a self-
funded option on the first place of their preference list. After the reform, the probability of 
ranking a self-funded program first increases by 10.5 %points for men, and by 13.1 
%points for women. The second regression estimates the probability of ranking a self-
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funded program on the last position on the preference list. The increase in the probability 
of ranking a self-funded program is larger for men and women than for the previous 
outcome. The last two columns show that after the reform more men and women rank at 
least one self-funded program and they also rank more self-funded options than before the 
reform.  
Tables A3-A5 in Appendix show the impact of the other control variables on 
application decisions. We find that matriculation exam scores significantly affect 
application decisions. Students who scored better on the exams or students who choose 
for an advanced exam are more likely to apply, rank more state-funded programs, but they 
are less likely to rank a self-funded program. Students who perform well on mathematics 
are more likely to apply to STEM programs. Finally, we find that disadvantaged students 
apply to less programs and are less likely to apply to self-funded programs.  
 
5. STRUCTURAL MODEL OF APPLYING TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
By decreasing the number of state-funded places in non-STEM programs, students had a 
lower probability of being admitted to these programs. To uncover the behavioral 
mechanisms that lead to the realized outcomes we found in the previous section, we 
estimate a structural model of program and institution choice, and we investigate whether 
students consider the probability of being admitted when applying. We assess whether this 
effect differs between men and women. We estimate the model on a cohort before the 
policy change and externally validate the model on the cohort that was affected by the 
reform. 
 
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
During the last year of secondary education, students can choose to apply for higher 
education in Hungary or not. A student  applies to a study program  at an institution 
 to maximize the utility of studying. The utility of applying to a specific study option 
is given by 
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with  the deterministic part of utility. Utilthe ity depends on an alternative 
specific constant , and personal characteristics such as gender and high school 
background . Utility also depends on the admission probability . Students obtain a 
higher utility from programs for which they have a higher probability of being admitted.15 
We interact this probability with gender to assess whether women are more responsive to 
admission probabilities when making their application decisions. Admission probabilities 
differ between programs but also between institutions. Given that students have to pay a 
fee for each study program they rank after their third option, students might strategically 
apply to a less popular institution for which they have higher admission probabilities. 
Previous literature shows that travel distance is an important factor of participation in 
higher education and the decisions where and what to study. Students have a preference 
for study options located in their neighborhood.16 We therefore include the travel distance 
 between the location of the high school of the student and the institution as a 
determinant of utility.17 Finally, utility depends on an unobserved preference shock , 
which is iid type 1 extreme value distributed. The probability that student  chooses for 
study program  at institution  is then given by the logit formula 
 
In the model, students take into account the probability of being admitted when 
applying to higher education. The probability that student  is admitted to study program  
at institution  is given by  
 
and depends on a program alternative specific constant , a vector of matriculation exam 
scores , and a measure of the capacity of program  at institution : .18 Capacity of 
                                                 
15 Varga (2006) shows that students take into account the expected admission probabilities when 
applying to study programs in higher education in Hungary. 
16 See for example Frenette (2010) and Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010). This last study shows 
that travel distance has a small effect on the participation decision, but a strong impact on the 
decision where and what to study. 
17 As we do not observe the location of residence of the student, we use the location of the high 
school attended by the student as a proxy for the place of residence of the student. 
18 In the estimation of the probability of admission and the utility equation, we do not distinguish 
between matriculation exams of the normal and the advanced level. Only a small fraction of high 
school graduates chooses for an advanced exam (see Table 2). Students choosing for an advanced 
exam in mathematics almost never rank a non-STEM program first. Therefore, it is not possible to 
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the program is defined as the ratio of admitted students relative to the total applicants in 
the study option. The capacity of the program serves as an exclusion restriction. Capacity 
influences the utility of applying to an option only indirectly through the effect on the 
admission probability. We assume that there is no direct effect of capacity on the utility of 
applying to specific options. Finally, the admission probability depends on an iid type 1 
extreme value distributed error term . 
We model the choice of all high school graduates in the year before the reform (2011). 
In the estimation of the model, we consider only the first option on the ranking of 
students. In 2011, high school graduates choose between 600 study options in academic 
higher education. They can choose not to apply to higher education or they can apply for a 
specific program at a specific institution. Finally, they decide between a state-funded or a 
self-funded place. Estimation of the model proceeds in two steps. We first estimate the 
probability of acceptance to the first option of the preference list with a binary logit 
regression. Next, we estimate the probability of choosing for option  at institution  with 
a conditional logit model. Given the size of our dataset, where 80577 students choose 
between 600 options, it is not computationally feasible to estimate the model with the full 
dataset. We therefore use a random subsample of 50 percent of the students. 
 
5.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Table 8, we estimate a binary logit regression for the probability of being admitted to 
the program ranked first on the preference list. We include interaction effects between 
matriculation exam scores with the dummies for the specific majors. We find that math, 
Hungarian language, and history scores significantly affect the probability of being 
admitted. This effect differs between programs. Performing well on mathematics is most 
important for science and engineering programs while performing well on the Hungarian 
language is most important for teaching, law and social science programs. Students have a 
higher probability of being admitted to a self-funded place. Test scores are less important 
for being admitted to a self-funded place. Finally, it is easier to be admitted to a less 
popular program (capacity indicator). 
                                                                                                                                                    
include dummies for the level of the exam when we estimate the probability of admission or the 
utility of applying to specific majors. 
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Table 9 shows the output of the conditional logit model for applying to the first option 
on the preference list. We obtain the following main findings that are consistent with the 
regression results in the previous section. Gender significantly affects the application to 
the several majors in higher education. Men obtain a lower utility than women in applying 
for non-STEM programs. Students who are older than 19 years when graduating from high 
school are less likely to apply to higher education. The scores of the matriculation exams 
significantly affect the decision to apply for programs in higher education. Scores on the 
mathematics exam are most important for applying to engineering, economics and science 
programs. Performing well in the Hungarian language has the strongest effect on applying 
to law and social science programs. Regarding the choice between state-funded or self-
funded programs, we find that students prefer to apply to state-funded places in which 
they do not have to pay tuition fees. Men, older students, and students living in Budapest 
are more likely to apply to a self-funded place. Students who perform well on the 
matriculation exams are less likely to apply for self-funded places. 
Table 8 
Being admitted to the first ranked program 
 ECON ENG TEACH HEALTH SCI AGRI 
Constant -11.331* 
(0.333) 
-8.456* 
(0.228) 
-10.524* 
(0.566) 
-8.333* 
(0.378) 
-8.590* 
(0.493) 
-8.641* 
(0.494) 
Mathematics 3.638* 
(0.261) 
5.722* 
(0.223) 
0.912 
(0.475) 
1.383* 
(0.299) 
4.835* 
(0.459) 
3.518* 
(0.436) 
Hungarian 
language 
3.509* 
(0.380) 
2.017* 
(0.266) 
6.938* 
(0.715) 
5.027* 
(0.547) 
1.461* 
(0.617) 
3.841* 
(0.640) 
History 4.651* 
(0.425) 
1.724* 
(0.300) 
4.769* 
(0.680) 
1.707* 
(0.531) 
4.073* 
(0.681) 
2.313* 
(0.719) 
       
 LAW ARTS SSCI  State Self 
Constant -16.306* 
(0.661) 
-6.701* 
(0.433) 
-12.700* 
(0.392) 
 - 4.874* 
(0.419) 
Mathematics 3.327* 
(0.409) 
1.585* 
(0.461) 
1.978* 
(0.248) 
 - -1.902* 
(0.600) 
Hungarian 
language 
7.616* 
(0.665) 
1.506* 
(0.611) 
6.250* 
(0.421) 
 - -2.896* 
(0.614) 
History 6.978* 
(0.694) 
2.869* 
(0.689) 
4.476* 
(0.433) 
 - -0.413 
(0.679) 
       
#admit/#applic 8.424* 
(0.311) 
     
Note Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The probability of being admitted to the first 
ranked option is estimated with a binary logit regression. The regression is estimated on the sample 
of all high school graduates that apply to higher education in 2011. 
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Next, we find that students take into account admission probabilities when making 
their application decisions. Students are more likely to apply to programs in which they 
have a higher probability of being admitted. This effect is stronger for women. This finding 
is consistent with Gneezy et al. (2003), and Reuben et al. (2015) who found that women 
are more risk-averse when choosing their field of study. Students dislike travel distance. 
We do not find that this effect differs between men and women. Finally, we show that 
students living in the area of Budapest obtain lower utility from applying to state-funded 
programs in higher education. Students living in Budapest are more likely to apply to self-
funded programs. 
5.3 MODEL VALIDATION 
Before simulating the impact of alternative policies, we assess how well the model 
performs in predicting actual application decisions of students. We perform both an in-
sample and out-of-sample validation. The first two panels of Table 10 present the within-
sample validation of the model for respectively men and women. We distinguish between 
STEM and non-STEM programs and state-funded and self-funded programs. The model 
performs very well in predicting the application decisions of both men and women. The 
following two panels show the results of the out-of-sample validation. The external 
validation assesses whether the model can predict choices of students under a different 
policy environment caused by the reform. We, therefore, use the parameter estimates of 
Table 9 to predict the study decisions of the high school graduates in the year after the 
reform. To compute the utility of each study option, we estimate the probability of being 
admitted to each option with a similar logit regression as in Table 8, but now on the cohort 
that was affected by the reform. The output of this logit regression is like the regression for 
2011 and is shown in Table A6 in Appendix. 
Table 9 
  Application decisions of first ranked option 
 ECON ENG TEACH HEALTH SCI AGRI 
Constant -7.442* 
(0.085) 
-8.591* 
(0.099) 
-5.124* 
(0.129) 
-8.329* 
(0.141) 
-7.925* 
(0.173) 
-7.220* 
(0.148) 
Male -0.719* 
(0.043) 
1.593* 
(0.058) 
-2.707* 
(0.140) 
-1.185* 
(0.068) 
0.227* 
(0.084) 
0.149* 
(0.072) 
+19 years 0.076 
(0.041) 
-0.209* 
(0.045) 
-0.101 
(0.073) 
-0.356* 
(0.065) 
-0.482* 
(0.085) 
-0.083 
(0.074) 
Mathematics 4.123* 
(0.111) 
5.413* 
(0.126) 
0.503* 
(0.199) 
3.270* 
(0.152) 
3.545* 
(0.192) 
2.267* 
(0.186) 
27 
 
Hungarian 
language 
2.181* 
(0.137) 
1.224* 
(0.139) 
1.444* 
(0.241) 
2.921* 
(0.215) 
1.330* 
(0.246) 
1.338* 
(0.238) 
History 1.718* 
(0.150) 
0.570* 
(0.154) 
0.913* 
(0.256) 
2.663* 
(0.229) 
2.120* 
(0.281) 
2.028* 
(0.263) 
Budapest -0.805* 
(0.044) 
-1.080* 
(0.047) 
-0.689* 
(0.081) 
-0.613* 
(0.067) 
-0.841* 
(0.084) 
-1.152* 
(0.082) 
Self -0.838* -3.074* -2.881* -2.007* -4.026* -2.370* 
 (0.172) (0.257) (0.300) (0.303) (1.013) (0.281) 
       
 LAW ARTS SSCI Self Prob admit Distance 
Constant -7.283* 
(0.125) 
-6.426* 
(0.108) 
-7.551* 
(0.092) 
- 1.756* 
(0.065) 
-0.015* 
(0.000) 
Male 0.057 
(0.055) 
-0.121* 
(0.056) 
-0.853* 
(0.046) 
0.519* 
(0.098) 
-0.673* 
(0.085) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
+19 years -0.084 
(0.058) 
-0.121* 
(0.057) 
0.077* 
(0.043) 
0.179* 
(0.085) 
- - 
Mathematics 1.000* 
(0.146) 
1.055* 
(0.151) 
0.453* 
(0.148) 
-1.708* 
(0.239) 
- - 
Hungarian 
language 
5.053* 
(0.200) 
2.229* 
(0.182) 
4.553* 
(0.148) 
-2.967* 
(0.276) 
- - 
History 1.371* 
(0.208) 
1.408* 
(0.197) 
1.922* 
(0.156) 
-1.456* 
(0.301) 
- - 
Budapest -1.279* 
(0.062) 
-0.304* 
(0.056) 
-0.572* 
(0.046) 
0.968* 
(0.082) 
- - 
Self -0.148 -2.530* -1.277* -   
 (0.185) (0.222) (0.182)    
Note Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The probability of ranking an option first is 
estimated with a conditional logit model. The model is estimated on the sample of all high school 
graduates of 2011. Results have to be interpreted relative to the base category of not applying to 
higher education. 
 
We observe that the model performs reasonably well in the out-of-sample predictions 
of the total number of students applying to the several majors. For example, while the 
observed fraction of male high school graduates applying to higher education decreased 
from 54.4% to 49.8% after the reform, our model predicts a similar decrease from 54.2% 
to 50.2%. The model slightly under predicts the negative effect on the total participation of 
women. While the observed fraction of women applying to higher education decreased 
from 61.8% to 54.8% after the reform, our model predicts a slightly lower decrease from 
61.9% to 56.6%. While our model performs well in predicting the choice between the 
several majors (which is further illustrated in Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix), our model is 
not able to explain the observed increase in the number of students applying to self-
funded programs. A possible explanation for this limitation of our model is that after the 
reform, more students prefer a self-funded program although there also some state-
funded places available in the same program. Given that there is no cost of applying to a 
state-funded place if a student has already ranked a self-funded place in the same 
program, it is not rational for students to not rank a state-funded option before a self-
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funded option in the same program. Shorrer and Sovago (2018) show that the fraction of 
students making these mistakes has increased after the reform. 
Table 10 
 Model validation 
 Observed choices Predicted choices 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: In sample validation: men (2011) 
STEM 25.1 0.1 25.2 25.1 0.1 25.2 
Non-STEM 27.6 1.6 29.2 27.6 1.5 29.0 
Total 52.7 1.7 54.4 52.6 1.6 54.2 
       
Panel B: In sample validation: women (2011) 
STEM 7.1 0.0 7.1 7.0 0.1 7.1 
Non-STEM 52.8 1.9 54.7 53.0 1.8 54.8 
Total 60.0 1.9 61.8 60.0 1.8 61.9 
       
Panel C: Out-of-sample validation: men (2012) 
STEM 24.8 0.4 25.2 28.8 0.1 28.9 
Non-STEM 18.3 6.3 24.6 20.1 1.5 21.7 
Total 43.1 6.7 49.8 48.9 1.6 50.5 
       
Panel D: Out-of-sample validation: women (2012) 
STEM 8.1 0.1 8.2 10.3 0.0 10.3 
Non-STEM 36.5 10.1 46.6 44.3 2.0 46.3 
Total 44.6 10.2 54.8 54.6 2.0 56.6 
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of high school graduates of 
respectively 2011 and 2012. 
 
6. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
We use the model to simulate the impact of alternative policies to further investigate how 
admission policies differently affect application decisions of men and women. The policy 
that was implemented in Hungary in 2012 aimed at increasing the share of students in 
STEM programs. The government, therefore, reduced the number of state-funded places 
in non-STEM programs and expected students to switch to STEM programs. This policy 
decreased the probability of being admitted to non-STEM programs and therefore made 
applying to these non-STEM programs less attractive. Instead of discouraging students to 
apply to non-STEM programs, alternative policies could also encourage enrollment in 
STEM programs by making applying to STEM programs more attractive without 
decreasing the utility of applying to other programs.  
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We use the model to simulate such a policy that increases the utility of applying to 
STEM programs by setting the probability of admission to these programs to one for all 
students. This policy corresponds to an open access policy in which all high school 
graduates, irrespective of high school background, can start at all STEM options. This 
policy might maybe not be preferred from a cost minimizing government because higher 
education systems without admission standards lead to unsuccessful drop out and 
reorientation to other programs during higher education (Declercq and Verboven, 2018). 
However, the policy simulations will us give further insights into how admission policies 
affect application decisions. 
Table 11 
 Counterfactual analysis: the impact of open access to STEM programs 
 Status quo Counterfactual policy 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: First ranked option (men) 
STEM 25.1 0.1 25.2 +10.1 0.0 +10.0 
Non-STEM 27.6 1.5 29.0 -4.0 -0.2 -4.1 
Total 52.6 1.6 54.2 +6.2 -0.2 +6.0 
       
Panel B: First ranked option (women) 
STEM 7.0 0.1 7.1 +6.9 -0.1 +6.8 
Non-STEM 53.0 1.8 54.8 -3.9 -0.1 -4.0 
Total 60.0 1.8 61.9 +3.0 -0.1 +2.7 
Note: Predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2011 high school graduates. Outcomes of 
the counterfactual policy are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the status quo. 
 
Table 11 shows the results of the counterfactual analysis for men and women. We again 
distinguish between applications for STEM and non-STEM programs and state-funded 
and self-funded places. Table A9 in Appendix shows the results for the specific majors. 
Under the counterfactual scenario of an open access policy in state-funded STEM 
programs, more men and women would apply to higher education, but there is also 
substitution from non-STEM to STEM programs. The fraction of high school graduates 
applying to higher education would increase by respectively 6.0 %points for men, and by a 
smaller amount of 2.7 %points for women. More men and women would apply to STEM 
programs (+10.0 %points for men, and +6.8 %points for women). While the relative 
increase in applications for STEM programs is larger for women, the increase in the total 
number of students applying for STEM programs is larger for men. This counterfactual 
policy will, therefore, further increase the gender gap in STEM programs.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
We have studied how admission policies differently affect the enrollment decisions of men 
and women, and how admission policies can increase enrollment of women in STEM 
programs. We evaluated how a policy reform that decreased the number of admitted 
students in state-funded non-STEM programs affected application decisions in higher 
education in Hungary. After the reform, fewer students applied to higher education. The 
impact was larger for women because the reform mainly reduced the number of state-
funded places in study fields that are preferred by women. Both men and women were 
more likely to apply to a STEM program and more students applied to a self-funded 
program after the reform. The latter effect is larger for women. 
To uncover the behavioral mechanisms that lead to the realized outcomes, we 
estimated a structural model of program and institution choice in higher education. We 
assessed how responsive students are to the odds of being admitted to a program when 
making their application decisions. We estimated the model on a cohort before the policy 
change and found that women were more sensitive to admission probabilities when 
making their application decisions. We externally validated the model on the cohort that 
was affected by the reform. Finally, we used the model to simulate how an alternative 
policy that stimulates enrollment in STEM programs would affect application decisions of 
men and women. We simulated how an open access policy in STEM programs would affect 
application decisions. We found that more students would apply to higher education and 
more students would apply to a STEM program. These effects are smaller for women and 
an open access policy in STEM programs would further increase the gender gap. 
Our findings have several implications for policy. First, governments can use 
admission policies to influence the decision to apply to higher education. We showed that 
when it becomes harder to be admitted to higher education, fewer students apply to higher 
education. If the aim of the government is to increase enrollment in higher education, 
increasing the number of places will lead to a higher number of applicants. Second, we 
find that increasing the selectivity in particular fields of study implied substitution to other 
programs that were not affected by the reform. This implies that students perceive the 
different study programs as substitutes. Governments can, therefore, increase enrollment 
in STEM programs by increasing the number of places in these programs or decreasing 
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the number of places in other fields of study. Finally, we also find that many students 
apply to self-funded programs after the reform. This shows that many students are willing 
to pay the contribution. This effect is most outspoken for programs in economics. 
Although the number of students admitted to state-funded places in economics almost 
decreased to zero, the total number of students admitted to programs in economics was 
not affected by the reform.   
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure A1 
Distribution of matriculation exam scores 
2011 2012 
Panel A: Mathematics  
  
Panel B: Hungarian Language  
  
Panel C: History  
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Table A1 
 Application decisions in higher education (first ranked option) 
 Men Women 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: 2011 
SSCI 5.2 0.3 5.5 14.1 0.5 14.6 
ECON 8.5 0.7 9.2 14.5 0.7 15.2 
ENG 22.3 0.1 22.4 4.6 0.0 4.6 
TEACHING 0.3 0.0 0.3 4.9 0.1 4.9 
HEALTH 2.2 0.0 2.2 7.3 0.0 7.3 
SCI 2.9 0.0 2.9 2.5 0.0 2.6 
AGRI 2.9 0.1 3.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 
LAW 4.4 0.5 4.9 4.9 0.4 5.3 
ARTS 4.2 0.1 4.2 4.6 0.1 4.7 
TOTAL 52.7 1.7 54.4 60.0 1.9 61.8 
       
Panel B: 2012 
SSCI 4.3 0.7 5.0 12.0 1.5 13.5 
ECON 2.0 4.2 6.2 2.6 6.7 9.3 
ENG 22.0 0.4 22.4 5.5 0.1 5.6 
TEACHING 0.2 0.0 0.2 5.0 0.2 5.1 
HEALTH 2.4 0.0 2.4 7.4 0.1 7.5 
SCI 2.8 0.0 2.9 2.6 0.0 2.6 
AGRI 2.8 0.1 3.0 2.9 0.1 3.0 
LAW 3.4 0.9 4.3 3.2 1.2 4.4 
ARTS 3.1 0.4 3.5 3.4 0.4 3.8 
TOTAL 43.1 6.7 49.8 44.6 10.2 54.8 
Note: The fraction of students applying to each option is expressed as a percentage of high school 
graduates of respectively 2011 and 2012. 
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Table A2 
Number of students applying in higher education (last ranked option) 
 Men Women 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: 2011 
SSCI 4.4 1.8 6.2 12.6 3.9 16.6 
ECON 5.6 3.4 9.0 10.6 4.5 15.1 
ENG 20.1 2.6 22.6 4.6 0.4 5.0 
TEACHING 0.4 0.1 0.5 4.3 0.8 5.0 
HEALTH 1.3 0.2 1.4 5.3 0.5 5.8 
SCI 3.9 0.3 4.2 4.0 0.3 4.2 
AGRI 2.5 0.8 3.3 2.2 0.5 2.6 
LAW 2.2 1.2 3.4 2.1 1.4 3.5 
ARTS 2.9 0.9 3.8 3.3 0.8 4.1 
TOTAL 43.2 11.2 54.4 48.9 13.0 61.8 
       
Panel B: 2012 
SSCI 3.3 3.0 6.2 8.5 6.6 15.2 
ECON 0.6 5.5 6.1 0.9 8.4 9.4 
ENG 15.8 6.4 22.1 4.4 1.3 5.7 
TEACHING 0.2 0.1 0.3 3.9 1.4 5.3 
HEALTH 1.3 0.4 1.6 5.3 1.0 6.3 
SCI 3.3 0.8 4.1 3.3 0.7 4.0 
AGRI 2.0 1.2 3.3 2.0 0.9 2.9 
LAW 1.8 1.1 2.9 1.5 1.4 3.0 
ARTS 1.9 1.3 3.2 2.1 1.1 3.1 
TOTAL 30.1 19.7 49.8 31.9 22.9 54.8 
Note: The fraction of students applying to each option is expressed as a percentage of high school 
graduates of respectively 2011 and 2012. 
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Table A3 
 Evaluation of the reform (applicants and the number of ranked study 
options) 
 Apply Total options 
 Coef. St. error Coef. St. error 
Female 0.080* (0.004) 0.096* (0.014) 
2012 -0.047* (0.004) 0.272* (0.015) 
Female*2012 -0.049* (0.006) -0.111* (0.020) 
+19 years -0.009* (0.003) 0.071* (0.012) 
Disadvantaged - - -0.227* (0.016) 
Matriculation exam scores    
     Math 0.798* (0.009) 0.364* (0.027) 
     Hungarian 0.541* (0.011) 0.108* (0.040) 
     History 0.457* (0.012) 0.657* (0.041) 
Advanced exam    
     Math 0.328* (0.007) 0.186* (0.021) 
     Hungarian 0.317* (0.007) 0.379* (0.033) 
     History 0.336* (0.004) 0.763* (0.015) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The decision to apply for higher education 
is estimated by a logit regression on the sample of all high school graduates of 2011 and 2012 
(158513 observations). Results are reported as marginal effects. The second regression is estimated 
by OLS on the sample of applicants to higher education (87939 observations). Both regressions 
include region fixed effects. 
 
 
Table A4 
Evaluation of the reform (ranking a STEM program) 
 STEM ranked first STEM ranked last At least 1 STEM Total STEM 
 Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error 
Female -0.299* (0.005) -0.305* (0.005) -0.339* (0.005) -0.912* (0.013) 
2012 0.018* (0.004) 0.016* (0.004) 0.014* (0.005) 0.302* (0.017) 
Female*2012 -0.005 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) 0.004 (0.007) -0.239* (0.020) 
+19 years -0.030* (0.003) -0.039* (0.004) -0.046* (0.004) -0.102* (0.011) 
Disadvantaged 0.000 (0.005) 0.017* (0.006) 0.026* (0.007) -0.043* (0.015) 
Matriculation exam scores       
     Math 0.634* (0.009) 0.715* (0.009) 0.888* (0.011) 2.287* (0.026) 
     Hungarian -0.256* (0.012) -0.223* (0.013) -0.314* (0.015) -0.797* (0.039) 
     History -0.236* (0.012) -0.206* (0.013) -0.198* (0.016) -0.664* (0.040) 
Advanced exam        
     Math 0.382* (0.011) 0.338* (0.010) 0.391* (0.009) 1.263* (0.028) 
     Hungarian -0.203* (0.003) -0.231* (0.005) -0.310* (0.006) -0.652* (0.016) 
     History -0.224* (0.002) -0.206* (0.013) -0.287* (0.004) -0.922* (0.012) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The first three regressions are estimated by 
a logit regression and results are reported as marginal effects. The last regression is estimated by 
OLS. All regressions are estimated on the sample of applicants to higher education in the year 
before and after the reform (87939 observations). All regressions include region fixed effects. 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table A5 
 Evaluation of the reform (ranking a self-funded program) 
 Self ranked first Self ranked last At least 1 Self Total Self 
 Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error 
Female 0.003 (0.003) 0.012* (0.005) 0.022* (0.005) 0.049 (0.010) 
2012 0.105* (0.003) 0.200* (0.005) 0.245* (0.005) 0.660* (0.013) 
Female*2012 0.026* (0.004) 0.017* (0.006) 0.028* (0.007) 0.114* (0.017) 
+19 years 0.013* (0.002) 0.030* (0.004) 0.040* (0.004) 0.113* (0.010) 
Disadvantaged -0.032* (0.002) -0.124* (0.005) -0.160* (0.005) -0.356* (0.012) 
Matriculation exam scores       
     Math -0.067* (0.004) -0.177* (0.009) -0.221* (0.010) -0.461* (0.023) 
     Hungarian -0.060* (0.006) -0.113* (0.013) -0.118* (0.014) -0.385* (0.035) 
     History 0.010 (0.006) 0.025 (0.013) 0.064 (0.014) 0.157* (0.036) 
Advanced exam        
     Math -0.030* (0.002) -0.054* (0.007) -0.058* (0.007) -0.117* (0.018) 
     Hungarian -0.033 (0.003) -0.037* (0.011) 0.001 (0.012) -0.118* (0.027) 
     History 0.031* (0.003) 0.085* (0.006) 0.161* (0.006) 0.418* (0.015) 
Note Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The first three regressions are estimated by 
a logit regression and results are reported as marginal effects. The last regression is estimated by 
OLS. All regressions are estimated on the sample of applicants to higher education in the year 
before and after the reform (87939 observations). All regressions include region fixed effects. 
 
Table A6 
 Being admitted to the first ranked program 
 ECON ENG TEACH HEALTH SCI AGRI 
Constant -8.455* 
(0.396) 
-8.353* 
(0.212) 
-11.312* 
(0.562) 
-9.515* 
(0.360) 
-9.061* 
(0.466) 
-9.563* 
(0.462) 
Mathematics 1.439* 
(0.458) 
5.302* 
(0.222) 
0.981 
(0.478) 
1.524* 
(0.345) 
3.399* 
(0.477) 
3.793* 
(0.437) 
Hungarian 
language 
1.552* 
(0.621) 
1.712* 
(0.268) 
7.959* 
(0.786) 
4.078* 
(0.542) 
1.806* 
(0.611) 
2.206* 
(0.608) 
History 4.263* 
(0.631) 
1.426* 
(0.285) 
3.534* 
(0.688) 
3.339* 
(0.552) 
4.452* 
(0.638) 
4.401* 
(0.660) 
       
 LAW ARTS SSCI  State Self 
Constant -13.041* 
(0.551) 
-7.546* 
(0.396) 
-10.928* 
(0.364) 
 - 1.101* 
(0.366) 
Mathematics 2.111* 
(0.466) 
0.520 
(0.434) 
1.482* 
(0.272) 
 - 0.732 
(0.410) 
Hungarian 
language 
7.430* 
(0.713) 
1.430* 
(0.569) 
4.766* 
(0.452) 
 - -0.148 
(0.552) 
History 3.821* 
(0.621) 
4.767* 
(0.632) 
4.814* 
(0.410) 
 - 0.200 
(0.562) 
       
#admit/#applic 12.026* 
(0.330) 
     
Note Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. The probability of being admitted to the first 
ranked option is estimated with a binary logit regression. The regression is estimated on the sample 
of all high school graduates that apply to higher education in 2012. 
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Table A7 
 Model validation (men) 
 Observed choices Model predictions 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: In-sample validation (2011) 
SSCI 5.2 0.3 5.5 5.4 0.2 5.6 
ECON 8.5 0.7 9.2 8.3 0.6 8.9 
ENG 22.3 0.1 22.4 22.3 0.1 22.4 
TEACHING 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 
HEALTH 2.2 0.0 2.2 2.0 0.0 2.1 
SCI 2.9 0.0 2.9 2.8 0.0 2.8 
AGRI 2.9 0.1 3.0 2.9 0.1 3.0 
LAW 4.4 0.5 4.9 4.3 0.5 4.8 
ARTS 4.2 0.1 4.2 4.3 0.1 4.4 
TOTAL 52.7 1.7 54.4 52.6 1.6 54.2 
       
Panel B: Out-of-sample validation (2012) 
SSCI 4.3 0.7 5.0 4.6 0.3 4.9 
ECON 2.0 4.2 6.2 2.2 0.6 2.9 
ENG 22.0 0.4 22.4 25.8 0.1 25.9 
TEACHING 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 
HEALTH 2.4 0.0 2.4 2.2 0.0 2.2 
SCI 2.8 0.0 2.9 3.0 0.0 3.0 
AGRI 2.8 0.1 3.0 3.4 0.0 3.4 
LAW 3.4 0.9 4.3 3.0 0.5 3.5 
ARTS 3.1 0.4 3.5 4.5 0.1 4.6 
TOTAL 43.1 6.7 49.8 48.9 1.6 50.5 
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of high school graduates of 
respectively 2011 and 2012. 
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Table A8 
Model validation (women) 
 Observed choices Model predictions 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: In-sample validation (2011) 
SSCI 14.1 0.5 14.6 14.2 0.5 14.6 
ECON 14.5 0.7 15.2 14.6 0.8 15.4 
ENG 4.6 0.0 4.6 4.4 0.0 4.4 
TEACHING 4.9 0.1 4.9 4.8 0.1 4.9 
HEALTH 7.3 0.0 7.3 7.3 0.1 7.4 
SCI 2.5 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.6 
AGRI 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.6 
LAW 4.9 0.4 5.3 4.8 0.4 5.2 
ARTS 4.6 0.1 4.7 4.7 0.1 4.8 
TOTAL 60.0 1.9 61.8 60.0 1.8 61.9 
       
Panel B: Out-of-sample validation (2012) 
SSCI 12.0 1.5 13.5 12.5 0.5 13.1 
ECON 2.6 6.7 9.3 4.5 0.9 5.4 
ENG 5.5 0.1 5.6 7.1 0.0 7.1 
TEACHING 5.0 0.2 5.1 5.0 0.0 5.0 
HEALTH 7.4 0.1 7.5 9.1 0.0 9.1 
SCI 2.6 0.0 2.6 3.3 0.0 3.3 
AGRI 2.9 0.1 3.0 3.5 0.0 3.5 
LAW 3.2 1.2 4.4 3.8 0.4 4.3 
ARTS 3.4 0.4 3.8 5.8 0.1 5.9 
TOTAL 44.6 10.2 54.8 54.6 2.0 56.6 
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of high school graduates of 
respectively 2011 and 2012. 
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Table A9 
 Counterfactual analysis 
 Model predictions Counterfactuals 
 State-
funded 
Self-funded Total State-
funded 
Self-funded Total 
Panel A: Men 
SSCI 5.4 0.2 5.6 -0.8 -0.0 -0.8 
ECON 8.3 0.6 8.9 -1.2 -0.1 -1.3 
ENG 22.3 0.1 22.4 +9.4 -0.0 +9.4 
TEACHING 0.3 0.0 0.3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
HEALTH 2.0 0.0 2.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.3 
SCI 2.8 0.0 2.8 +0.8 -0.0 +0.8 
AGRI 2.9 0.1 3.0 -0.4 -0.0 -0.5 
LAW 4.3 0.5 4.8 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 
ARTS 4.3 0.1 4.4 -0.7 -0.0 -0.7 
TOTAL 52.6 1.6 54.2 +6.2 -0.2 +6.0 
       
Panel B: Women 
SSCI 14.2 0.5 14.6 -1.0 -0.1 -1.0 
ECON 14.6 0.8 15.4 -1.1 -0.1 -1.2 
ENG 4.4 0.0 4.4 +5.1 -0.0 +5.1 
TEACHING 4.8 0.1 4.9 -0.3 -0.0 -0.4 
HEALTH 7.3 0.1 7.4 -0.5 -0.0 -0.6 
SCI 2.6 0.0 2.6 +1.8 -0.0 +1.8 
AGRI 2.6 0.0 2.6 -0.3 -0.0 -0.2 
LAW 4.8 0.4 5.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 
ARTS 4.7 0.1 4.8 -0.4 -0.0 -0.4 
TOTAL 60.0 1.8 61.9 +3.0 -0.1 +2.7 
Note: Predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2011 high school graduates. Outcomes of 
the counterfactual policy are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the status quo. 
 
 
